Stakeholders, strategy, and staple diversification: A game-theoretic analysis of food security policy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61511/tafoa.v3i1.2026.4143Keywords:
food security, food diversification, game theory, Indonesia, public policyAbstract
Background: Food security is a strategic priority for Indonesia, yet the country has not fully capitalized on its abundant natural resources. Its 2022 Global Food Security Index (GFSI) score was only 60.2 (ranked 63rd of 113 countries), and 8.53% of the population still experiences undernourishment (Prevalence of Undernourishment). Food policymaking is fragmented because stakeholders hold divergent interests and time horizons, making it a wicked problem. Staple diversification was chosen as the case study because it is backed by a legal framework, but its implementation is hindered by entrenched rice-consumption culture and misaligned programs. Methods: This study combines bibliometric analysis (keywords “food security”, “policy”, “game theory” and “public policy”, “game theory”) with game theory modeling. Four players were modeled: government, producers, consumers, and academics. Each chooses between Cooperating and Maintaining the Status Quo. Of the 16 possible scenarios, those categorized as failures were pruned. Feasible scenarios were assigned qualitative utilities (scale of -3 to +3) for short-term (ST) and long-term (LT) outcomes, then analyzed using Nash equilibrium, Pareto dominance, and ST-greedy behavior. Findings: Full cooperation (C, C, C, C) is the only Nash equilibrium that is stable in both the short and long term. Implementation occurs only when government, producers, and consumers are aligned in the short term. Producers act as the main bottleneck, while academics are structurally disempowered because they do not determine implementation success. “Mutate” outcomes represent realistic partial success, and ST-greedy equilibria are often insufficient. Conclusion: Staple diversification succeeds only when short-term incentives are aligned across sectors. Recommendations include targeted short-term incentives, prioritized support for producers, consumer engagement, adaptive implementation frameworks, and academic partnerships. Novelty/Originality of this article: This study applies multi-actor game theory with ST and LT horizons to Indonesia’s staple diversification policy, a topic that remains rarely examined in the literature. Its contributions include a payoff matrix as a policy-design tool and new insights into the roles of academics and producers.
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